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Resumo 
The paper analyses the nature and features of the Knowledge Regions and their emergence 
in the international system as strategic players in the process of glocalization, strongly 
anchored in the creation of dense knowledge networks and the development of an active 
paradiplomacy which enables the regions to project externally their specific interests and to 
reinforce their influence in the process of multilevel governance functioning as strategic 
brokers between the global and the local. In this context the paper discusses the 
implications of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments to the foreign policies of 
central governments and argues that not only paradiplomacy does not present a risk to the 
coherence of foreign policy  but constitutes a major factor for the consolidation of the soft 
power of states. 
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Introduction 
The increasing complexity of the international system is particularly illustrated by the 
heterogeneity of players and the growing influence of non-state actors as well as by the 
existence of a system of multilayered and diffused governance, where there is 
coexistence and interplay between supranational, regional, national and sub-national 
levels, not the monopoly of the global level, leading to a considerable ambiguity in the 
international system, namely about the exact location of authority, its fragmentation 
and the management of overlapping jurisdictions and rules.  
The major structural changes societies and the international system are experiencing 
are determined not only by globalization but also by two other distinct processes which 
are intertwined with it: the emergence of the “knowledge-based society” and the 
“network society”. The processes of globalization and of building the knowledge society 
originated two different phenomena which are apparently contradictory. Globalization is 
behind the development of macro-regionalism insofar as macro-regions enable the 
exploration of scale economies, the rationalization of production systems and 
transaction costs and the development of transparent competition rules. In contrast the 
knowledge-based society has worked in a different direction introducing the dimension 
of "localization" and stimulating the development of micro-regionalism. There is 
sufficient evidence to support the argument that the evolution of the world economy is 
not simply characterised by globalization but by “glocalization”, a more complex 
process involving simultaneously globalization and localization.  
Knowledge regions, strongly anchored in multi-actor knowledge networks and a 
proactive paradiplomatic international action, have emerged as relevant players in the 
international system and the real competitors in the global economy. The paper is 
structured in three parts. The first part discusses the main factors behind the 
emergence of the micro knowledge regions in the context of the process of 
glocalisation. The second part analyses the features and dynamics of knowledge 
regions both the old ones in advanced countries but also the new ones in the emerging 
economic powers, China, Brazil and India. The third part addresses the phenomenon of 
paradiplomacy and its strong linkages with knowledge regions and discusses the 
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implications of the new knowledge society paradigm in terms of changes in the 
philosophy and practice of foreign policy.   
 
Globalisation, knowledge society and the emergence of knowledge 
regions 
The international system has been experiencing not only a process of globalisation but 
more precisely a dual process of “globalisation cum localisation” which some authors 
have named glocalization or fragmegration1. The joint effect of this globalisation-
localisation process, with their points of complementarity and their contradictions, is 
inducing a major paradigm shift in societal structures, in the way the economy and 
markets function and states operate and how citizens relate to each other and to the 
state 
Globalisation has been a widely discussed topic but still remains a rather ambiguous 
concept with at least four different meanings to it2. The first perspective sees 
globalisation as internationalisation, stressing the intensification of interaction and 
increasing interdependence between countries/states. A second view equates 
globalization with liberalization, implying the elimination of barriers to the free flow of 
goods, capital and people, the reduction of state restrictions and deregulation. Thirdly, 
globalization has also been regarded as universalisation, implying the creation of global 
norms and values (by states) and gradual reduction of cultural differences. Finally, 
globalisation can also be seen as deterritorialisation, reflecting the fact the territory, a 
fundamental basis of organisation of westphalian sovereign states, lost relevance as 
transnational networks and new forms of social organisation that transcend territorial 
borders emerged and non-state actors became increasingly influential at the 
international level. Unlike the others, the last meaning implies a qualitative change and 
distances itself from the state-centric approach insofar it underlines the new role and 
influence of non-state actors.  
Localisation is associated with the emergence of knowledge-based economies and 
societies which are those where knowledge became the determinant factor of 
innovative production (new products, production processes and organizational 
methods), and innovation the key ingredient behind competitiveness. The most 
valuable aspect in the production of knowledge is the investment not in physical capital 
but above all in intangible assets: human capital, knowledge capital and social capital. 
In the knowledge society social activities are particularly geared towards the 
production, the distribution and effective use of knowledge which allows for the 
capacity to create and innovate new ideas, thoughts, processes and products and to 
translate them into economic value and wealth. On the other hand, the knowledge 
society is also a learning society where there is a strong priority attached to learning 
and “learning how to learn” which conditions the sustainability of the process.  
In stressing the centrality of the process of knowledge creation and diffusion it is 
important to point out not only that there are different types of knowledge but also that 
 
1  See James Rosenau (2002). “Governance in a new Global Order”. In David Held and McGrew (eds.) 
Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge Polity Press: 70-86. 
2  Dominique Moisi, IFRI (2001). “The Knowledge-based society – beyond IT revolution”, paper presented at 
the Annual EU-Japan Journalists Conference: Reacting to the knowledge-based society: European and 
Japanese views, Dublin, 7-9 March. 
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some have a higher strategic value than others. An important distinction to be made 
between two fundamental types of knowledge: (i) Coded knowledge (know-what and 
know-why) which can be equated with information and easily acceded through 
databases, books or lectures; (ii) Tacit knowledge (know-how and know-who) which is 
more difficult to have access to insofar it presupposes practical experience and social 
practice, in particular the know-who which is socially embedded knowledge that can not 
easily be transferred through formal channels. 
“Tacit Knowledge” is the most decisive and strategic kind of knowledge because it is 
crucial to interpret, select and integrate coded knowledge, as well as to learn new skills 
and forget old ones. Moreover, with the advances in information technologies the 
increasingly cheap and easy access to vast information makes tacit knowledge even 
more relevant because it is scarcer and selection and interpretation of coded knowledge 
becomes paramount.  
The creation and diffusion of tacit knowledge, unlike coded knowledge, requires a social 
context, face-to-face interaction and trust and it is unlikely to be transferred on an 
anonymous base. This is where the “network society” factor has to be accounted for, in 
the sense that the social networks that involve a diversity of actors and contribute to 
the upgrading of the level of social capital 3– i.e.  the capacity members of a society 
have to develop mutual trust and cooperate to achieve common goals -  is a 
fundamental condition for the creation of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
considered to be only transferable among actors who share norms and values and 
possess a high level of social capital.  
The transition to the knowledge society/economy has become a key issue in the 
strategic thinking of many societies and states and is gradually becoming a priority in 
the political agenda of governments. Thus far, this trend involves mainly “strong 
states,” developed countries or emerging new powers, which already have a strong 
position in the global economy. The analysis of the EU Lisbon Strategy and the updated 
“Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”; Japan’s 
“Innovation 25” strategy, the US “American Competitiveness Initiative”; Brazil’s 
Programa “Três Tempos”; China’s “Harmonious Socialist Strategy” already made 
operational in the 11th Five-Year Plan and updated in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015) currently in its final process of approval; or India’s 11th Five-Year Plan, shows 
that, since the late 1990s, these actors have engaged in the formulation and 
implementation of strategies to facilitate a transition to a knowledge society/economy4.  
The relationship between the two processes of globalization and knowledge-society is 
rather complex. Globalization is at the same time undermining localisation, insofar 
instantaneous transfer of information regardless of location undercut traditional 
competitive factors  such as proximity to inputs and markets, and reinforcing 
localisation as this ability to source from anywhere becomes open to everyone and 
therefore ceases to be an advantage. In this context the “location paradox” emerges in 
the sense that “…the most enduring competitive advantages in a global economy seem 
 
3  In the sense of the concept developed by Putnam, see Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993. 
4  Neves, Miguel (2007). “National Experiences in Managing the transitions towards a knowledge 
Society/Economy - Same Dreams, Different Beds”. In Estratégia, nº 22-23, IEEI.
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to be local” as argued by Porter5.  Moreover, the environmental costs of globalisation 
are now increasingly at stake. The pressing standards of corporate environmental 
responsibility and the concerns over climate change and the reduction of CO2 
emissions, questions the sustainability of the fragmentation of globalized production 
processes pressing for location near the consumer markets in order to minimise 
emissions thus providing new advantages to localisation.   
Michael Enright6 argues that this is only an apparent paradox as this twin process tends 
to be essentially complementary insofar the process of localisation of competitive 
advantages of firms is a necessary condition to compete in the global market. In other 
words, firms have first to consolidate their knowledge creation and innovation 
capabilities in their local/regional clusters and networks, as innovation is today the 
main driving force behind competitiveness, in order to meet the new challenges of 
globalisation.  
However, I would argue that there is not only complementarity and convergence; there 
is also divergence, tension and contradictory effects between the two at different 
levels.  
Firstly, while globalisation reduces the relevance of the territory in the old way, the 
knowledge society grants a new strategic significance to the territory. Given the 
centrality of tacit knowledge and the fact its creation requires direct social interaction 
on a territorial base, we can then understand how the knowledge society and the 
network society processes have contributed for the territory to regain importance but in 
a new perspective: not because it is controlled by the state or is the basis for the 
exercise of sovereignty, but because of the social activity that takes place there and the 
density of the knowledge networks. Knowledge creation became a territorialized 
phenomenon, insofar it enables national/regional actors to develop trust, form 
networks, produce common norms and values, develop partnerships and engage in 
mutual learning.  
From this perspective, the knowledge society and economy contradicts the opposite 
trend of deterritorialisation set in motion by globalisation. As a consequence the local 
and regional levels gained a new strategic value, because it is the optimal dimension 
for the creation and operation of the knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit 
knowledge. 
Secondly, globalisation generates a concentration of economic power, setting in motion 
a complex process of mergers and acquisitions which have been taking place in many 
sectors, while the knowledge society tends to generate greater dispersion of power and 
assets and to stimulate co-operation. This concentration of economic power and the 
formation of major conglomerates in the financial sector is clearly one of the structural 
causes behind the current financial and economic crisis insofar it created the syndrome 
of “too big to fail” and weakened the capacity of states to carry out effective regulation 
and moderate market abuses and anti-social behaviour of conglomerates. At the same 
time this same process weakened the glocalisation process insofar global banks bought 
or pushed out of the market smaller regional/local banks with closer ties with the local 
 
5  Michael Porter (2000). “Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global 
Economy“. In Economic Development Quarterly, 14: 15-34. 
6   Enright, OECD (2001). Enhancing SME competitiveness. The OECD Bologna Ministerial Conference, Paris, 
Background paper for workshop 2. 
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economy and institutions: as a consequence credit became less accessible to SMEs 
clusters and knowledge networks 7.  
Thirdly, in terms of policy responses, globalisation requires from the point of view of 
regulation the fight against monopolies / dominant positions and strict enforcement of 
competition rules while the knowledge society/economy implies a logic of greater 
cooperation between firms, universities, research centres, local governments, NGOs 
and other partners that integrate the knowledge networks and greater tolerance with 
regard to practices that from a formal perspective could be seen as violating 
competition rules. In other words, the new paradigm of the knowledge society has far 
reaching institutional and regulatory implications insofar it requires a flexibilisation of 
rules in several areas notably in competition and intellectual property rights in order to 
remove major obstacles to knowledge diffusion.  
Fourthly, globalisation is behind the development of macro-regionalism and regional 
integration while the knowledge society is favouring an opposite trend of micro-
regionalism, thus facilitating the development of two different kinds of regionalism with 
two different logics. 
The development of this new micro-regionalism is anchored on, and driven by the 
emergence of the knowledge regions, a new actor both in terms of knowledge creation 
and innovation and of governance whose strategic relevance derives from the very 
nature of tacit knowledge production and dissemination as will be discussed below.  
The new strategic relevance of the knowledge regions is associated with different 
factors.  
To begin with, the necessity to introduce new forms of Governance within states that 
induced decentralisation and devolution of powers to sub-national governments. The 
systemic effects of globalisation caused the weakening of the Westephalian state, 
although with considerable differences between strong and weak states, as a result of 
the incapacity of central bureaucracies to deal effectively with a whole new range of 
complex issues, the growing power of non-state actors and the emergence of new 
sources of loyalty and identity that compete with nationality.  
Secondly, the knowledge regions emerged as the systemic mediators between the local 
and the global managing contradictions and addressing the new multi-level governance 
challenges. To a large extent they are the real competitors in the global economy and 
acquired a deep understanding about its logic and dynamics. One can argue that it is 
regions rather than countries that are competing in the global economy. Conversely at 
the local level they function both as the catalysts of the organisation of local actors’ 
strategies and actions to pursue their interests in the global economy and as the safety 
net to cushion negative effects of globalisation, thus contributing to social stability. 
Thirdly, the relevance of the knowledge regions derives also from their strategic role in 
strengthening Global Governance insofar they operate already on the basis of multi-
actor knowledge networks whose expertise is required to respond to the complex 
regulation of very technical issues. This puts knowledge regions in a privileged position 
to provide inputs to global rule-making. Similarly, they have a crucial role to play as far 
as rule-implementation and adaptation to local conditions and specificities are 
 
7  See Stiglitz, Joseph (2006). Making Globalization Work, Penguin Books. 
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concerned, thus being a strategic player in ensuring both the voluntary compliance to 
and enforcement of global rules.  
 
Knowledge regions: features and dynamics 
The concept of Knowledge Regions is relatively recent and there is not yet a consensus 
about its precise contents. However, it is clear that the concept refers to micro-regions, 
territorial units which are parts of a State, that operate as regional innovation systems 
according to the new logic of the knowledge economy and society. Although the focus 
has been more on national knowledge regions I would argue that transborder regions 
involving parts of different states cutting across political boundaries can also constitute 
knowledge regions (transborder). In spite of the fluidity of the concept, I would argue 
that a comparative analysis suggests that knowledge regions display some fundamental 
common features which go far beyond economic aspects to include sociological, 
governance and political dimensions. The most fundamental features include the 
following aspects: 
(i) High level of human capital as a result of a consistent level of investment, 
especially  in education and training, with important consequences not only in 
terms of productivity but also in terms of acquisition of new skills, innovation 
capacity and learning capabilities.  
(ii) High investment in R&D, public and private, and efficiency of the system 
translated in good performance as far as outputs are concerned, particularly 
patents. 
(iii) Possession of a core group of knowledge-intensive industries and/or knowledge 
services which play a strategic role in securing innovation and competitiveness: IT 
and computer manufacturing (computer and office equipment, electronic 
components, communication equipment); Biotechnology and chemical sectors 
(pharmaceuticals, drugs, chemical products); Automotive and high-technology 
mechanical engineering (motor vehicles and transport equipment, machine tools 
and equipment); Instrumentation and electrical machinery (precision and optical 
equipment, electrical transmission equipment, lighting and wiring equipment); 
High-technology services (software and computer related services, 
telecommunications, research, consultancy, development and testing service). 
(iv) High level of social capital, implying good levels of cooperation and trust between 
members of the community, which favours the development of dense regional 
networks between regional knowledge actors, enhancing the capacity to produce 
and diffuse tacit knowledge.  
(v) Communities characterised by a strong multicultural trait, associated with the 
presence of a significant foreign community from a variety of countries and 
cultures, also because as dynamic innovation poles they attract talents from other 
countries and regions, which facilitates a better knowledge about other cultures 
and visions of the world. 
(vi) New forms of governance, less hierarchical and more participatory, which put 
great emphasis on active public-private partnerships, devolution of powers to local 
governments and new forms of articulation between different levels of 
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government and policies aimed at facilitating entrepreneurship in both public and 
private sectors. 
(vii) High international profile in many cases associated with a reasonable level of 
international participation based on a proactive paradiplomacy in areas of low 
politics carried out by sub-national governments in close co-ordination with the 
private sector and civil society organisations. 
This illustrates the complex, multidimensional and far-reaching structural changes that 
underpin the emergence of knowledge regions. It should be noted that these traits are 
tendencies and therefore they are combined in very different proportions in different 
regions, some might even be absent or not fully consolidated in specific regions. 
Moreover, despite the commonalities mentioned above there is not a homogeneous 
model of knowledge region; there are obviously many points of divergence and 
different degrees of maturity between different experiences. 
Comparative analysis of Knowledge Regions has been carried out by Robert Huggins8 
who has been producing the World Knowledge Competitiveness Index. This Index is an 
overall benchmark of the knowledge capacity, capability and sustainability of the best 
performing and most dynamic regions in the global economy.  
The World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2008 provides the most recent analysis of 
the performance of the leading knowledge regions in the world. It compares 145 
regions - 63 from North America (USA and Canada), 54 from Europe and 28 from Asia 
and Oceania – and is headed by the San José region in the US followed by other US 
regions. In the top 10 there are two non-US regions Stockholm (6th) the best 
performing European region and Tokyo (9th) the best performing Asian region. The top 
50 rank is dominated by US regions but includes 13 European regions and 9 Asian 
regions. At the bottom of the ranking we find the Chinese and Indian regions as well as 
regions from Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that all the most developed 
Chinese coastal regions are now integrated in the group.  
Comparing the 2008 results with the 2005 Index it is possible to conclude that while 
the leading knowledge centres are still in the US, the American predominance is less 
overwhelming insofar there is a clear improvement in the performance of the 
knowledge centres outside the US, namely in the EU and Japan which place 13 regions 
(7 in 2005) and 7 regions (1 in 2005) respectively in the top 50 knowledge regions. 
Moreover, there are few US regions that have improved their position since 2005 which 
suggests that the considerable gap between US regions and European and Asian 
regions is narrowing.  
In developed countries the most competitive knowledge regions have consolidated their 
competitive advantages and lead the process of innovation. They are clearly the 
engines of their respective economies and the key competitors in the global market.  In 
the US the San José-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara region, which includes Silicon Valley, is for 
some time the leading region supported in very high rates of investment in education 
and R&D  (such as NASA) with a strong basis in knowledge–intensive sectors in 
particular the IT, high-tech services and instrumentation and electrical machinery 
sectors. The top US knowledge regions group include also Boston-Cambridge endowed 
 
8  Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui (2008). World Knowledge Competitiveness 
Index 2008, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales 
Institute, UK.  
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with a high quality terciary education sector with 8 strong research universities in 
particular Harvard and the MIT; San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont; Hartford and Seattle-
Tacoma-Bellevue.  
In Europe the strongest knowledge region is Stockholm (Sweden) which ranks 6 in the 
ranking of the world knowledge competitiveness index. It has a highly educated 
population - 39% has terciary education and 45% secondary education – and a 
diversified economic structure although with a particular specialisation in knowledge-
intensive services and in some high-tech industrial activity: Information 
Technologies/Electronics; Software/Internet; Health and Biotechnology; Transport and 
Logistics. 
Other leading knowledge regions in Europe include West, South and Ostra 
Mellansverige in Sweden; West, East, North and South regions in the Netherlands; 
Pohjois-Suomi, Etela-Suomi and Lansi-Suomi in Finland; Ile de France (Paris region) 
and Centre-Est in France; Luxembourg; Denmark; Norway; Badden-Wurttemberg , 
Bayern, Hamburg and Bremen in Germany; Eastern, South East and South West in the 
UK; North West and Lombardia in Italy; Noroeste/Catalunya and Madrid in Spain. 
In Japan knowledge regions have also improved their performance in recent years. 
Tokyo is the leading Japanese region (ranks 9 in the 2008 WKCI), possessing a strong 
high-tech services sector and high rates of patents, followed by Shiga, strong in specific 
knowledge sectors instrumentation and electric engineering and IT and computer 
manufacturing, Kanagawa, Toyama, Osaka and Tochigi regions.  
While the role of these knowledge regions in securing the leadership of advanced 
economies in the innovation process is well known, the role new knowledge regions 
have been playing in developing economies that have emerged recently as economic 
powers is often overlooked and less known. The main argument is that one of the key 
factors behind the success of the new emerging economic powers, in particular China, 
Brazil and India, is the gradual consolidation of knowledge regions inside these 
countries which have performed the roles of the main engines of economic growth, 
centres of innovation and the fundamental bridges to the global economy. The other 
side of the coin has been the asymmetric nature of their development processes.  
In China, there are three crucial knowledge regions with different profiles: the “Bohai 
Rim region” (Beijing, Tianjin, parts of Shandong and Liaoning); the “Yangtze River 
Delta” with the leading centre in Shanghai and involving also 7 cities in Zhejiang and 8 
cities in Jiangsu provinces; the “Pearl River Delta”, involving Guangdong province and 
the ties with Hong Kong and Macao. The 9 coastal provinces involved in these 3 leading 
poles of the Chinese economy account for nearly 2/3 of China’s GDP (62%) and GDP 
per capita is 1.7 times higher than the national average; more than 75% of China 
exports. It is important to note that each region has its own development model and its 
specific strong points9.  
The Bohai Rim region has been characterized as a government driven model with the 
most intensive R&D facilities (42 of the 91 institutes of the Chinese Academy of Science 
 
9  See Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui, World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 
2008, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales 
Institute, UK: 34-46; On PRD and YRD comparative analysis see Chen Xiangming (2006). Regionalizing 
the Global – local Economic Nexus: a tale of two regions in China. Great Cities Institute, Working Paper, 
University of Illianois Chicago, March. 
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are located here) as well as the top universities (Tsinghua University and Peking 
University) and nearly 25% of university students and 30% of R&D researchers are 
located in the region which accounts for 34% of national R&D expenditure.  This is 
mainly explained by intensive investment by the Chinese government in the last two 
decades. 
In contrast the Yangtze River Delta is labelled as a city-network driven model by which 
the new knowledge and technology absorbed by Shanghai from its own industrial 
dynamism and strong presence of foreign multinationals is then diffused from Shanghai 
to smaller cities around it, in particular Nanjing, Suzhou and Hangzhou where specific 
clusters are maturing. It has strong knowledge intensive sectors in particular the 
automobile industry, the IT sector and chemicals and machinery as well as more dense 
knowledge networks in particular strong ties between firms and universities and high 
levels of technological commercialization.  
Finally, the Pearl River Delta region is qualified as a FDI driven model as it has been an 
important recipient of foreign investment accounting for 20% of FDI stock in China, 
especially from and through Hong Kong, and the main basis of China exports as the 
region is the origin of nearly 1/3 of Chinese exports although the share has declined in 
recent years. Although the science and technology basis, the education indicators and 
the density of knowledge workers are not strong points, the region benefits from the 
intensive presence of foreign investors which are associated with some knowledge 
transfer through workers and managers, the formation of local SMEs clusters and the 
proximity of an international centre like Hong Kong with knowledge-intensive services. 
In India three main knowledge regions are behind the emergence of India as a global 
economic power : (i) Mumbai, capital of the state of Maharashtra, is the financial 
capital of India and a region with strong knowledge intensive sectors - IT, Health sector 
and audiovisual namely the film industry of Bollywood – responsible for 40% of India 
exports; (ii) Hyderabad, capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh with a series of relevant 
sectors IT, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and high-tech services sectors, is a main 
exporter of software products ; (iii) Bangalore, capital of the state of Karnataka, is 
known as the Indian Silicon Valley reflecting the fact it is the  leading IT sector 
producer and exporter in India accounting for 34% of India total exports10 of IT 
products, and is also an important biotechnology centre. 
In Brazil the leading knowledge region is the state of São Paulo which has set up 
several knowledge networks associated with the programme “Arranjos Produtivos 
Locais” which involves SMEs, universities, research centres, local governments aimed at 
building strong ties between the different players and fostering innovation11. The state 
is already the powerhouse of the Brazilian economy accounting for 34% of total GDP in 
200712 (down from 37% in 1995) and for 43% of Brazil’s industrial output and 
possesses a group of knowledge-intensive sectors namely chemical industry, 
machinery, medical instruments, auto industry, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, IT and 
nanotechnology sectors. 
 
10  See Invest in India “17 billion software exports for India’s IT state, http://investmoneyinindia.com 
(2.08.10) 
11  Secretaria do Desenvolvimento, Governo de São Paulo, www.desenvolvimento.sp.gov.br/drt/apls 
(2.08.2010) 
12  Fundação Sistema Estadual Análise de Dados e IBGE, www.seade.gov.br (2.08.2010) 
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One of the important characteristics of knowledge regions is their increasing direct 
participation in the international system and their ability to act more or less 
autonomously in the international stage and develop paradiplomacy actions that can be 
parallel or complementary to actions developed by national governments. 
 
Paradiplomacy and foreign policy in the knowledge era  
A crucial issue in terms of prospective analysis is the implications of the new knowledge 
society paradigm for structural changes in foreign policy taking the emergence of 
knowledge regions into account. There are interesting developments which suggest 
potential fundamental changes to the goals, nature and instruments of foreign policy in 
a global knowledge society.  
The first development is the new relevance of paradiplomacy developed by sub-national 
governments, in particular by the governments of knowledge regions. These are 
increasingly active in the international arena, mainly in areas of low politics (trade, 
investment, science and technology, culture, and education), trying to project their 
specific interests according to a dual logic: on the one hand, a process “from the inside 
out” reflecting the fact that local governments go out to promote local interests and 
reduce the risks of international threats; on the other, a process “from the outside in” 
whereby non-central governments become the focus of attention and suffer pressures 
from both foreign governments and non-state actors as they realise that influence at 
the central level is no longer sufficient to pursue their aims. This is a potential area of 
conflict with the traditional diplomacy of central governments13.  
The development of paradiplomacy is a growing trend in the international system 
clearly illustrated by the old and more developed knowledge regions as well as by the 
new ones in the emerging countries. Paradiplomacy first entered the international 
system through the British Dominions (Canada, South Africa, Australia) in the context 
of the British Empire in the 1920s. For the first time the international activity of non-
sovereign governments, although seen as a deviant behaviour, was tolerated by the 
international community and the Dominions gained autonomy in negotiating 
international trade agreements and other economic matters. This set a precedent. Hong 
Kong was later on one of the pioneers of modern paradiplomacy as a result of a 
structural conflict of interests between the colonial power, Britain, and the colony on 
trade matters leading London to informally accept since the late 1950s Hong Kong´s 
autonomy and capacity to negotiate directly trade agreements with foreign states. The 
Hong Kong SAR still has an active paradiplomacy based on the action of the network of 
HK Trade Offices (Geneva, Brussels, Washington, San Francisco, New York, Toronto, 
Tokyo, Sydney, Singapore, London) at the bilateral level and HK`s participation in 
multilateral organisations, particularly in WTO. The Canadian Province of Quebec was 
another case in point since the early 60s when it developed close ties and signed 
bilateral agreements directly with France on cultural matters which generated conflicts 
with the Federal government.  
 
13   Brian Hocking (1993). Localizing foreign policy – non-central governments and multilayered diplomacy, 
London, St. Martin’s Press. 
  Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (ed) Federalism and international relations – the role of 
subnational units, Clarendon Press, 1990. Duchacek, uses the word paradiplomacy in “Perforated 
sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international relations” in Michelmann (ed.) Federalism 
and International Relations: 1-33. 
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Since the late 1980s, also facilitated by the strategic decompression after the end of 
the Cold War, the expansion of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments has 
been a silent but fundamental change in the international system and the way in which 
states act internationally. The most developed regions became proactive in the 
international stage, mainly motivated by economic reasons, as illustrated by various 
cases. The German Lander such as Badden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria developed a 
certain degree of external autonomy, establishing networks of external representation 
offices in several countries in all continents. Bavaria for example has built since the 
mid-1990s a network of external representations in 22 countries in Asia (China, India, 
Japan, Vietnam), Africa (South Africa), America (Brazil, Mexico, Canada, USA New York 
and USA San Francisco) and in several European countries. Interesting enough some of 
these offices are located in other knowledge regions such as Guangdong the Pearl River 
Delta and Shandong in China, Bangalore in India, São Paulo in Brazil and Tokyo in 
Japan14.  
In the context of the US states, California, the powerhouse of US knowledge economy, 
has been one of the most proactive through the activity of Governors and of the 
California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency and its network of trade offices 
abroad (Tokyo, London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Mexico City, Shanghai, Taipei, 
Johannesburg, Seoul, Singapore) until 2003 when the agency was dismantled. But 
many other States such as Florida, New York, Nebraska, North Dakota, Kentucky or 
Colorado have followed the same path and are also active internationally, under the 
leadership of their Governors who perform the role of economic ambassadors seeking 
to promote the competitiveness of their States in the global economy and to boost their 
own political profile15. 
Another interesting example is Catalunya which enjoys a high degree of autonomy in 
domestic affairs and has developed since the late 1980s a very active paradiplomacy 
that promotes its specific economic and cultural interests in the international arena 
through the activities of the network of external offices managed by COPCA (Consorci 
de Promoció Comercial de Catalunya) participated by the Catalunya Government, 
Chambers of Commerce, industry sectoral associations and export associations. These 
entities jointly created and manage the network of 35 external trade offices located in 
31 countries and covering 70 countries around the world16, including China (Beijing, 
Shanghai), India (New Dehli), Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil (São Paulo) or the USA 
(Washington, New York, Los Angeles) at the same time it directly supports firms at 
home through training and assistance for the development of their international/export 
departments. Moreover, bilateral relations with States and other Non-Central 
Governments are one of the priorities leading to the signature of international 
agreements in a variety of areas ranging from trade, investment, education, culture, 
science and technology or health.  
 
14  See Invest in Bavaria, State Agency (http://www.invest-in-bavaria.de/en/bavarias-foreign-
representations/) 
15   A good example of this “profile-boosting strategy” has been California’s Governor Schwarzenegger 
signature of an agreement on climate change with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006. On US states’ 
paradiplomacy see McMillan, Samuel Lucas (2008). “Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why 
Governors participate in US Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy Analysis, 4, 227-253. For example, 
California’s Governor Gray Davis created a secretary of foreign affairs and hosted political leaders from 
China, Japan and Singapore. In 2001 alone California hosted foreign dignitaries from 67 countries. 
16  See Generalitat Catalunya, COPCA (http://www.acc10.cat/ACC10/cat) acceded 3.08.2010 
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In the case of China the development of the paradiplomacy of the leading Chinese 
provinces since the mid-1990s although discrete and with little visibility, has been a 
major factor to explain China’s integration in the global economy and her impressive 
emergence as a global economic power. Indeed one of the key institutional ingredients 
of China’s economic success has been the high level of decentralisation of economic 
decision-making from central government to provincial governments and even to local 
governments, including in foreign trade and attraction of FDI, since the early stage of 
reforms. The paradiplomacy of the most developed coastal Chinese provinces, an 
extension of this internal autonomy, was further developed as a consequence of the 
implementation of the “Go Global” strategy implemented since 2000 and has gradually 
been blessed by the Central Government, encouraged by the positive experience with 
Hong Kong’s external autonomy since 1997. Beijing saw this paradiplomacy as useful 
and complementary insofar it could function as a mechanism to explore more informal 
channels with economic partners and nurture special relationships; mobilize the 
overseas Chinese business communities; and even as a solution to manage economic 
relations with countries which have no diplomatic relations with the PRC.  
Guangdong Province has been probably the pioneer and developed since the mid-
1990s, under the coordination of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Guangdong Provincial 
Government, special relations with some “sister provinces” in various continents. As far 
as Europe is concerned Guangdong developed paradiplomacy relations with 7 European 
Provinces/Regions: Utrecht (2002), with initiatives in the areas of environmental 
protection, agriculture, and trade; Skane (Sweden) 1997, especially exchanges in 
education, environment and medicare; Alpes Cote d’Azur (2000); Catalonia (2003); 
Fyn Region (Denmark) 2004; State of Bavaria (2004). This special relationship involved 
the organisation of trade missions, the creation of permanent trade and investment 
offices such as the offices opened by Catalonia and Utrecht (jointly set up with Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce the Holland House in Guangzhou), the organisation of 
investment promotion seminars, participation in trade fairs etc. 
There are also more recent but interesting examples of other provinces belonging to 
the other growth pole of the Chinese economy, the Yangtze River Delta which have 
invested in building preferential ties with specific European regions. In the case of 
Jiangsu, the Provincial Government opened 5 Economic and Trade Offices in Europe 
with the headquarters located in Dusseldorf in 1996 followed by the offices in Paris, 
Chelmsford - Essex County and East England (UK), Tilburg – Province of Noord-Brabant 
(Netherlands) and Stockholm (Sweden)17. Specific European regions have also 
established their own trade offices in Nanjing, capital of Jiangsu, like Essex County, the 
German Landers of Nordrhein Westfalen and Baden-Wurttemberg, through Baden-
Wurttemberg International18, or the Paris Department of Haute Seine. For obvious 
reasons Shanghai is an important location of trade and investment offices from the 
paradiplomacy of EU regions having developed special relations with Barcelona, Milan, 
Rotterdam, Hamburg, Liverpool, Marseille, Antwerp.  
 
17  The intensity of paradiplomacy initiatives is rapidly increasing. For example the Giangsu Provincial 
Department of Trade and Economic Cooperation organized several investment seminars in France, Italy, 
Germany, Belgium and Britain between 21-31 May 2007, involving more than 100 entrepreneurs from 
Jiangsu. This initiative alone led to the signature of investment contracts worth US$ 1.3 billion and import 
and export contracts of more than US$ 100 million (see http://www.china-jiangsu.org/news.htm). 
18  Illustrating this increasingly closer relationship between the two regions, Baden-Wurttemberg and 
Shanghai created a joint portal in the Internet (http://www.bw.shanghai.de/portal.jsp). 
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Another case in point is the special relationship between the Lander of Bavaria and 
Shandong Province which developed special ties in terms of mutual investment 
promotion, but also cultural exchanges and even swap and training of civil servants. 
Bavaria has created the State of Bavaria Shandong Office in 1997 and in September 
2006 the Shandong Provincial Government opened in Munich the Business 
Representative Office of Shandong with the blessing of China’s Central Government. 
However, it should be stressed that this paradiplomacy does not concern exclusively 
the Provincial level, there are also paradiplomacy initiatives at the municipal and county 
levels contributing to a much more complex picture, especially because a minimum 
level of coordination that exists between Central and Provincial Governments is much 
more difficult to ensure in relation to lower levels of government.      
In the case of Brazil the paradiplomacy of the Brazilian States, called “federated 
diplomacy”, is a recent phenomenon pioneered by the States of Rio de Janeiro and Rio 
Grande do Sul in the late 1980s followed by São Paulo, Paraná, Baía or even other 
states involved mainly in transborder paradiplomacy with neighbouring states – 
Roraima, Acre, Amazonas e Amapá19. The Federal State has recognised and to some 
extent favoured the increasing international proactivity of sub-national governments 
and tried to set up a coordination mechanism in 1997, the “Assessoria de Relações 
Federativas” between the Itamaraty and the state and municipal governments in order 
to ensure there was no major contradictions between national foreign policy and 
paradiplomacy initiatives20. In addition the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created 8 
representation offices in various states and regions to operationalise the process which 
constitutes an innovative solution. This can be seen as an act of legitimisation of 
paradiplomacy by the central government. The most recent trend has been the 
intensification of paradiplomacy relations, anchored in bilateral agreement, between 
Brazilian States and Chinese Provinces: São Paulo-Shanghai, Baía-Shandong, Pará-
Sichuan, Paraná-Hainan, Mato Grosso-Jiangxi. 
Looking at these different experiences it is possible to point out some conclusions 
concerning the nature, dynamics and impact of paradiplomacy at present. 
First, it should be stressed that paradiplomacy is not an homogeneous phenomenon on 
the contrary has a heterogeneous nature. On the one hand this is the result of the 
coexistence of different types of paradiplomacy as argued by  Duchacek identifying 
three different types of paradiplomacy according to its contents and regional scope: (i) 
transborder regional diplomacy (or micro-regional), referring to transborder relations 
between geographically contiguous NCGs which was initially the dominant form (ii) 
transregional paradiplomacy (or macro-regional) between NCGs which are not 
contiguous and (iii) global paradiplomacy, involving distant players, including sovereign 
states and touching all issues in the international system, including security, 
international trade etc21. I would argue that another type of paradiplomacy should be 
 
19  See Francisco Gomes Filho and Alcides Costa Vaz (2008). “Paradiplomacia no contexto da Amazonia 
brasileira – estratégias de desenvolvimento regional do Estado de Roraima”. In Ci & Desenvolvimento, 
Belém, vol. 4, nº 7, jul-dez 2008: 155-165. 
20  See Decree 2.246/1997 República Federativa do Brazil; On Brazil’s paradiplomacy see Gilberto Rodrigues 
(2006), "Política Externa Federativa. Análise de Ações Internacionais de Estados e Municípios Brasileiros". 
CEBRI Tese, Rio de Janeiro, CEBRI. 
21  See Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (1990) (ed), Federalism and international relations – 
the role of subnational units, Clarendon Press: 299-312 and Duchacek, “Perforated sovereignties: towards 
a typology of new actors in international relations” in Michelmann (ed.) Federalism and International 
Relations: 1-33.
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identified “multilateral paradiplomacy” that refers to the participation of some sub-
national governments in multilateral organisations and the production of multilateral 
rules being the best example Hong Kong. These different types of paradiplomacy have 
different impacts both on the international system and national foreign policy. Whereas 
transborder regional paradiplomacy does not raise much controversy and is accepted 
and even promoted by central governments, transregional and, above all, global 
paradiplomacy is more likely to raise tensions and tend to be regarded with suspicion 
by central governments. In addition the more we move towards complex and 
demanding global paradiplomacy or multilateral paradiplomacy more robust 
institutional and financial capacity is required. 
On the other hand, I would argue that a major distinction must be drawn between a 
permanent and structured modality of paradiplomacy, mainly developed by the richest 
knowledge regions, developed according to a long term strategy, and sporadic and non-
structured paradiplomacy activities involving the use of specific instruments for short-
term purposes. There is an important qualitative difference between these two 
modalities which has to be acknowledged with clear implications for the density of the 
international status of sub-national governments. 
Second, concerning the conditions of success, in spite of the diffusion and explosion of 
paradiplomacy, the practice of a robust, effective and consistent paradiplomacy is still 
strongly associated with, and somehow restricted to rich and powerful knowledge 
regions operating within States, federal or unitary, possessing a considerable level of 
decentralisation. These are the sub-national governments that have the financial 
means, the human resources, institutional capabilities and the level of domestic 
autonomy to engage in complex international relations. In this context it should be 
stressed that domestic autonomy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The 
degree and dynamics of substantive external autonomy is fundamentally determined by 
the complex interplay between three different factors: SNG own institutional capacity 
and strategy to act internationally; the pattern of relations with the Central 
Government and the mechanisms and level of control exerted by the former; the 
attitude and recognition of external players and willingness to interact on the 
international stage. In short, there are different conditions of success that interact 
which include not only institutional conditions related to level of decentralisation and 
economic conditions concerning the resources and strengths of regions, but also 
political conditions, related to the attitude of central governments, and regional 
leadership conditions22. 
Third, the concerns over the dysfunctional nature of paradiplomacy and the risks of 
conflicts between central governments and sub-national governments expressed in the 
1990s by authors like Soldatos, are no longer justified. This “chaos scenario,” heavily 
influenced by the state-centric view, considered paradiplomacy to be a dangerous 
derogation of state power and a clear threat to the coherence and unity of foreign 
policy: sub-national actors were regarded as trespassers and their behaviour as 
deviant. A major shift in perception has occurred. In fact as a result of accumulated 
experience, and leaving aside the few exceptions where sub-national governments had 
separatist agendas, paradiplomacy is by and large seen as beneficial and a positive 
 
22  These factors have been highlighted by Keating, M. (2000). Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking, 
paper presented at the Forum of Federations: an International Federalism 
(http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs). 
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contribution to strengthen the overall international position of states, strongly 
illustrated by the Chinese, Brazilian and Spanish cases, and less and less perceived as a 
deviant behaviour. In other words it can be argued that paradiplomacy is no longer 
seen as an anomaly but on the contrary as a normal and increasingly diffused practice 
which central governments have even encouraged and ought to incorporate in their 
foreign policy planning23. 
Fourth, traditional analysis tend to see paradiplomacy as a consequence of globalization 
and the need local/regional communities have to respond to new challenges and 
increasing uncertainty in order to pursue their specific economic interests in the global 
market, to project their cultural identity and to overcome the limitations and rigidities 
of traditional central bureaucracies that are slow to adjust to new conditions. However, 
it seems more accurate to consider that paradiplomacy is simultaneously a 
consequence of glocalisation and a cause, a catalyst of glocalisation. Knowledge 
networks are behind the development of paradiplomacy through regional governments. 
Building on the fact they are leading poles of innovation, networks aim at enhancing 
their competitive position in the global market but also to link up and cooperate with 
other knowledge networks abroad. This means that paradiplomacy is not a passive and 
defensive response to globalization, on the contrary it is indeed part and parcel of the 
process of globalization, it contributes to greater integration in the global market and is 
the expression of the multi-level governance paradigm. 
Fifth, paradiplomacy is a fundamental source of innovation in foreign policy insofar it 
incorporates and anticipates some of the changes in the conception and rationale of 
States’ foreign policy that will be brought about by the new knowledge 
society/economy paradigm. To start with the abolition of the boundaries between the 
domestic and the external levels, there is clearly a continuum, external action is just 
the extension of domestic network activity and should involve the same players. This 
also implies a more holistic approach and greater coherence and coordination between 
domestic policies and foreign policy as well as greater transparency and citizen 
participation. Moreover, it shows that external action will be more and more a multi-
actor, multidimensional process where public, private and third sector actors have to 
engage and combine their different skills in the context of long term partnerships. 
Knowledge networks involving coordination and cooperation between governments, 
business, NGOs, academia, trade unions becomes paramount for effective external 
action not only in terms of implementation but also in terms of policy conception. 
Furthermore, paradiplomacy highlights the growing importance of informal channels 
and procedures and the role of Soft Law in the regulation of the international system 
which ensures flexibility and adaptability to adjust to uncertainty and rapid change. 
Finally, new global issues involve increasingly technical and complex issues requiring 
expertise which governments lack therefore requiring the active involvement and 
contribution of private firms, universities, research institutions. In this respect it is 
relevant to highlight the new role of global transnational networks in international rule-
 
23  In the same line Michael Keating (2000). Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking, paper presented at the 
Forum of Federations: an International Federalism (http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs). Andrew Petter 
referring to the Canadian experience clearly states that “…Canadian Governments have facilitated and 
encouraged paradiplomacy over the years as a means of accommodating nationalist sentiments, regional 
interests and economic pressures” – see Canadian Paradiplomacy in practice: confessions of a 
paradiplomat, paper presented to the Conference The International Relations of the Regions: sub-national 
actors, para-diplomacy and multi-level Governance, Zaragoza, 2006 (mimeo). 
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creation, and renewed concern with global rule-implementation, which pressuposes the 
active involvement of sub-national actors and knowledge regions insofar as they can 
adapt global rules to local specificities. 
Sixth, paradiplomacy is a strategic channel for the creation and consolidation of the 
“soft power”24 of States not only because of the informal channels and instruments it 
uses but also because of the fundamental relevance of the issue-areas addressed by 
paradiplomacy, namely trade, investment and economic cooperation; education and 
human capital; migrations; science and technology; culture and identity. All of these 
are crucial dimensions of “soft power” and this is the main reason behind the open-
minded and tolerant attitude of China’s Central Government with regard to some 
Chinese Provinces’ paradiplomacy the more so as this was combined with the Chinese 
Diaspora strategy, another crucial instrument of China’s soft power. Dense and robust 
knowledge regions, internationally proactive are the main builders of soft power in the 
context of glocalisation.  
However, despite internationally proactive knowledge regions are a fundamental tool to 
sustain systemic competitiveness in the global economy and consolidate soft power, 
this is a phenomenon that involves a limited number of states. Still, the majority of 
states are excluded from this trend as they have been slow to adapt to the new 
paradigm, both in terms of changes in governance models and policies, and failed to 
create the necessary conditions to facilitate the emergence of knowledge regions. On 
the contrary, they tend to hold on to very centralized systems believing that only a 
strong centre can respond to the new threats and face the challenges of glocalisation.   
A good example is the case of Portugal where a historical centralist tradition has been 
somehow reinforced by the dynamics of the EU integration process. As a result Portugal 
is today one of the most centralised states in Europe a major factor preventing the 
emergence of dynamic regions.  
Portugal went through a vivid debate on regionalisation and decentralisation in the late 
1990s as a consequence of the process of referendum on regionalisation held in 1998 
which culminated in the rejection of the proposal to create 8 administrative regions 
along the lines foreseen in the law25. The creation of administrative regions was a 
binding principle already enshrined in the 1976 Constitution but never implemented. In 
spite of possessing since 1976 two autonomous regions, Madeira and Azores, the 
continental part of the Portuguese territory has been managed under a fairly 
centralised system making Portugal one of the most centralised states in Europe26.  
The terms of the debate in 1998 analysed in more detail elsewhere27 and the 
arguments put forward revolved around the implications of regionalisation for the 
reform of public administration, national cohesion and the impact on development 
 
24  In the sense used by Joseph Nye (2004). Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, Public 
Affairs. 
25  Law 19/98 which defined 8 regions: Entre Douro e Minho; Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro; Beira Litoral; 
Beira Interior; Estremadura e Ribatejo; Lisboa e Setúbal; Alentejo; Algarve. 
26  See Hahan J.P. and Loo, M.V. (1999). A Seminar Game to Analyze Regional Governance in Portugal, 
Lisboa, FLAD e Rand Corporation. The level of centralisation can be measured by the share of tax revenue 
controlled by the Central Government which reached 93% in Portugal (Central government+social 
security) which means that the share of local governments in total tax revenue was 6.2% in 2005, the 
same as in 1998 see OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2006, 2007, Paris ; OECD Tax and the Economy – 
comparative assessment of OECD countries 2001 
27  See André Freire and Michael Baum (2001). “O referendo Português sobre a Regionalização numa 
perspectiva comparada” in Penélope, nº 24: 147-178. 
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asymmetries between regions, the organisation and coordination between municipal 
governments and the risks of corruption, nepotism and intensification of political 
clientelism. In short, regionalisation was then seen strictly as a domestic issue and 
analysed in the same logic prevailing in the 1970s when the issue was first raised, as if 
the world had not changed, and taking no account of the experiences and results of 
other EU countries. Surprisingly there was no reflection on the dynamics and challenges 
of the knowledge society/economy and its implications for governance. 
In the last decade the debate on regionalisation has been frozen and no real advances 
were made in terms of promoting descentralisation. The opportunity costs of no-
regionalisation have been considerable if we look at Portugal’s fragile capacity to 
respond to the challenges of globalization and the transition to the knowledge society. 
Regionalisation should not be approached from a restrictive and outdated domestic 
perspective but from a wider perspective as part and parcel of Portugal’s strategy to 
deal with globalization and enhance its competitiveness in the global economy. It 
should be stressed that competitiveness is a systemic process and so the 
competitiveness of the Portuguese economy can not be confused with the 
competitiveness of a few Portuguese large firms. As long as the core nucleus of the 
Portuguese productive system, the SMEs, is not involved the sustained competitiveness 
of the Portuguese economy is at risk. 
The inexistence of knowledge regions in Portugal is the main cost of no-regionalisation 
and a major impediment for Portugal’s capacity to foster the process of innovation and 
compete in the global market. As argued earlier, the regional level is the optimal level 
for the creation of knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit knowledge. 
Although regionalisation is not a sufficient condition, it is certainly a necessary 
institutional and political condition for the emergence of knowledge regions. In addition, 
it provides interesting opportunities for the development of paradiplomacy in Portugal, 
an important tool to complement traditional foreign policy and to explore new channels 
and opportunities in an increasingly complex international system. The potential 
contributions of the paradiplomacy of future regions are varied but I would stress the 
capacity to: facilitate the redefinition of relations with the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities and support a more proactive strategy towards them; explore new ties 
with other European regions; respond positively to the paradiplomacy initiatives 
developed by Chinese Provinces or Brazilian and Indian States; link up with the 
Portuguese diaspora and integrate it as strategic players and a major asset in the 
globalized world.     
 
Conclusions 
Knowledge regions are strategic leading players in the process of transition to the 
knowledge society/economy and the main competitors in the global economy. If it is 
true that they allowed advanced economies to retain control over the innovation 
process and therefore preserve the leadership in the world economy, it is also true that 
knowledge regions are a key factor behind the rise of the new emerging economic 
powers, namely China, Brazil and India, which challenge the dominance of the US, EU 
and Japan. Knowledge regions became also new actors in the international system, still 
with an informal and fluid status, as their governments are increasingly active 
internationally through organized and permanent paradiplomacy actions and structures. 
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This external dimension of knowledge regions, in general overlooked, is a fundamental 
ingredient of their success and capacity to pursue their specific economic, political, 
scientific or cultural interests and project their identity. 
Paradiplomacy practised on a permanent and structured basis by sub-national 
governments of the most advanced knowledge regions, or on sporadic and non-
structured basis by other regions, is mainly focused on low politics areas, ranging from 
trade and investment, to science and technology, education, culture issues and involves 
the use of both formal instruments, such as international agreements or trade offices, 
and informal instruments. Far from being marginal areas, these are on the contrary 
crucial issues for the building of knowledge society and for strengthening the soft power 
of states. One of the key arguments put forward is that paradiplomacy is a strategic 
channel for the creation and consolidation of soft power, the capacity to influence 
others and shape their behaviour by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion. 
The knowledge society and the logic of knowledge networks have important 
consequences in terms of changes in foreign policy and the way in which states interact 
with each other and with non-state actors. In this respect it is argued paradiplomacy is 
an important source of innovation and somehow anticipates some of the inevitable 
changes to come in central governments’ external action, namely the abolition of 
boundaries between the domestic and the international levels, requiring an integrated 
approach and greater coherence and coordination between domestic policies and 
foreign policy; the implementation of a multi-actor process highly participated both in 
terms of formulation and implementation which is the effective way to respond to the 
increasing complexity of both the issues-areas and the international community; the 
increasing relevance of informal channels and the role of Soft Law and transnational 
networks in international regulation. 
Contrary to concerns expressed over the risks of conflicts between central and sub-
national governments and threats to the unity of state foreign policy, experience 
demonstrates that paradiplomacy is a positive factor and contributes to strengthen, not 
weaken, the international position of states and overcome some of its vulnerabilities, in 
particular to expand the soft power of states. As a consequence paradiplomacy ceased 
to be seen as unorthodox and marginal and tends to be gradually perceived as a 
normal activity with a fundamental strategic importance insofar knowledge regions are 
clearly the best positioned brokers between the global and the local, with a crucial role 
to play in the improvement of Global Governance, both in rule-setting and rule-
implementation, and the operation of the multi-level governance system.  
 
 
  
 
 
